Re: On the necessity of non-neural correlates -- Was:discontinuities in Leibnitz

Serge,

Another of the alternatives is to notice that with, say, one instance of the non-neural correlates of ~consciousness, that is, nested structural coding within hydrogen-bonding and protein-folding, all  that's required for explanation/understanding is merely association, or, technically, nested associations, aka, ~expression.  

I suppose one could think of such flexing of the nested fields within nested fields  as like, fuzzy causality, which seems to match up nicely with nested multiple states push-pulling for an adjacent balance into (one or more) associated nested multiple states, and with ALL our fuzzy experience.  The hard core causality is, after all, a strongly classical notion anyway, and it is likely fruitless to look to hard core causality or similar types of logics to help work out this rather subtle puzzle. 

Of the three options:

1. Start with neuronal correlate

2. Start with theory of consciousness

3. Start with non-neuronal correlates 

as shown above, while unfamiliar, option 3., illuminates the region somewhat better than the other two do.

Think about it.

Best regards,

Ralph Frost

Paradigm Transition  Support

[fSci] --  Frost Scientific

http://frostscientific.com

http://structuredduality.blogspot.com

With joy you will draw water

from the wells of salvation. Isaiah 12:3

---In jcs-online@yahoogroups.com, wrote :

Randi Gerl on Nov 6, 2014 wrote:
>Correlation does not necessarily imply identity nor does correlation
>necessarily imply causality.
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[S.P.] But establishing causality is required for there to be explanation and understanding. Yes, the neural correlates of consciousness are not "explanans of consciousness", and all that multitude of neuroscientists is just spending time, efforts, and funds in vain. However, if consciousness cannot be explained in terms of neuronal activity, then, maybe, the neuronal activity itself can/should be explained in term of consciousness? So, the theory of consciousness should go first, and only then we may arrive at understanding of the mechanisms of brain functioning.
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Best,
Serge Patlavskiy